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John Norton’s argument that all formal theories of induction fail raises substantive questions about the philosophical analysis of scientific reasoning.  What are the criteria of adequacy for philosophical theories of induction, explanation, or theory structure?  Is more than one adequate theory possible?  Using a generalized version of Norton’s argument, I demonstrate that the competition between formal and material theories in philosophy of science results from adhering to different criteria of adequacy.  This situation encourages an interpretation of “formal” and “material” as indicators of divergent criteria that accompany different philosophical methodologies.  I characterize another criterion of adequacy associated with material theories, the avoidance of imported problems, and conclude that one way to negotiate between conflicting criteria is to adopt a pluralist stance toward philosophical theories of scientific reasoning.
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Formal and Material Theories in Philosophy of Science: 
A Methodological Interpretation

1. When Philosophers of Science Disagree
According to John Norton there are no universal rules of inductive inference (Norton 2003).  Every formal theory put forward thus far (e.g., Bayesianism, hypothetico-deductivism, or inference to the best explanation) has failed to identify a universal inductive schema that is immune to problematic counterexamples.  These counterexamples make the inductive scheme unreliable or exhibit fallacious instances.  As an alternative, Norton argues for a “material theory of induction” whereby all inductive inferences are licensed by local facts, i.e., the empirical content within a particular domain of scientific investigation.  This explains why formal theories of induction that abstract away from this empirical content fail; they lack the resources for demonstrating why induction successfully functions in scientific inquiry because they aspire to apply to all inductive reasoning.
It is perhaps unsurprising that Norton’s thesis has met with resistance and criticism.  But the distinction between formal and material theories raises substantive questions for philosophical inquiry about science.  Many other debates in philosophy of science, whether they pertain to explanation, discovery, or theory structure, exhibit a similar situation.  No formal theory has yielded consensus and philosophers have increasingly pursued material theories based on the empirical content of specific sciences (cf. Brigandt 2010).  What are the criteria of adequacy for producing successful philosophical theories about science?  Is more than one adequate theory possible?  Can we pursue material and formal theories in philosophy of science?
The present paper probes these questions by looking at a generalization of Norton’s argument against formal theories of induction.  This reconstructive endeavor demonstrates that formal and material theories adhere to distinct criteria of adequacy.  Formal theories are often judged against the criterion of universality—whether they are applicable to all instances of induction or explanation (for example).  Material theories are often judged against the criterion of successful functioning—whether they account for the past inductive or explanatory success of the science under scrutiny.  This situation encourages an interpretation of “formal” and “material” as indicators of divergent criteria of adequacy that accompany different philosophical methodologies.  A methodological interpretation of formal and material theories suggests that we need to characterize more explicitly criteria of adequacy when analyzing science philosophically.  By way of example, I discuss another criterion of adequacy—the avoidance of imported problems—that often accompanies material theories in philosophy of science and motivates complaints against Fodor’s criticism of Darwinism (e.g., Fodor 2008).  Imported problems are difficulties that derive from the philosophical theory used to analyze science, not from the reasoning found in the science itself.  I propose that one way to negotiate between conflicting criteria of adequacy is to adopt a pluralist stance toward philosophical theories of scientific reasoning; i.e., we can pursue both material and formal theories because it is possible to have more than one adequate or correct theory.

2. Norton’s Negative Argument
In order to reconstruct Norton’s argument against formal theories of induction, we need to highlight three of its defining characteristics.  First, Norton’s conception of formal theories is expansive: “By formal theories, I intend something very broad. They are certainly not limited to accounts of induction within some formalized language or logic.  The defining characteristic is just that the admissibility of an inductive inference is ultimately grounded in some universal template” (Norton 2003, 649).  For any formal theory, this characteristic has two aspects: (a) the absence of empirical content, which makes the template applicable to all empirical reasoning, and (b) monism, which means the theory (if correct) excludes others.  Thus, no more than one formal theory can be correct and its universality is purchased by not relying on empirical content to license inductive inferences (similar to validity in deductive reasoning).  A material theory is in direct conflict with (a) because it is grounded in specific empirical content and therefore unlikely to be applicable in other domains or to phenomena investigated by different sciences (Brigandt 2010).  For the moment, I leave it open whether material theories are committed to some version of monism (b). 
The second defining characteristic is Norton’s claim that the failure of formal theories is not just a provisional setback but symptomatic of a more serious problem: “It is high time for us to recognize that our failure to agree on a single systemization of inductive inference is not merely a temporary lacuna. It is here to stay” (Norton 2003, 648).  This ‘time to give up’ conclusion is critical to motivating Norton’s alternative offering, a material theory of induction.  
The third characteristic of Norton’s argument is the distinction between universality and successful functioning: “Theories of induction must address an irresolvable tension between the universality and the successful functioning of some formal account of induction. The present literature favors universality over function” (648).  The criterion of universality puts different formal theories in competition with one another; they universally quantify over incompatible propositions.  If the Bayesian perspective on induction is correct (i.e., universally applicable), then the hypothetico-deductive perspective on induction is incorrect.  Successful functioning is a different criterion based on the past success of inductive inquiry in specific scientific domains.  Universality and successful functioning are distinct criteria of adequacy for a philosophical theory of induction that pull in different directions—a genuine tension, as noted by Norton.  Norton holds that giving more weight to successful functioning as a criterion demonstrates the need for and advantages of a material theory of induction, but he does not explore questions about how to choose between these two criteria or whether other criteria are relevant.
Having identified these defining characteristics, we can proceed to reconstruct Norton’s argument against formal theories of induction (i.e., the negative argument).

(i) A philosophical theory of induction must account for the successful functioning of induction in scientific reasoning.

(ii) Formal theories of induction (e.g., Bayesianism) have failed (thus far) to provide an account that underwrites the successful functioning of induction in scientific reasoning.

(iii) The failure of formal theories of induction results from the assumption that a theory of induction should not be based on particular empirical content in a specific area of science (i.e., the theory should be formal).

(iv) Therefore, a material theory of induction (based on particular empirical content from specific areas of science) is a better candidate for an account of how induction successfully functions in scientific reasoning.

Premise (i) makes the shift from universality to successful functioning as the foremost criterion of adequacy for a theory of induction.  Premise (ii) refers to the current evaluation (i.e., failure) of formal theories with respect to successful functioning.  Premise (iii) is the turning point in the argument because it claims that the failure is not temporary; it is a symptom of seeking a single universal template for inductive inference that does not rely on any appeal to empirical content.  The very idea of a formal theory is the root of their failure to account for inductive reasoning and explains why it is time to give up.  The conclusion (iv) reintroduces empirical content as a remedy to account for the successful functioning of induction in scientific inquiry.  Note that the reconstruction does not include key elements of Norton’s positive argument in support of his material theory of induction because the conclusion (iv) does not specify how the empirical content licenses successful inductive inference.  Here I only treat the negative argument.

3. The Negative Argument Generalized
Norton’s negative argument can be generalized by replacing induction with a variable (x), whose values range over standard topics in philosophy of science (e.g., explanation, discovery, induction, or theory structure; see Brigandt 2010).  The reason to pursue a generalization along these lines is that it highlights the criteria of adequacy embedded in the argument.

(I) A philosophical theory of x must account for the successful functioning of x in scientific reasoning.

(II) Formal theories of x have failed (thus far) to provide an account that underwrites the successful functioning of x in scientific reasoning.

(III) The failure of formal theories of x results from the assumption that a theory of x should not be based on particular empirical content in a specific area of science (i.e., the theory should be formal).

(IV) Therefore, a material theory of x (based on particular empirical content from specific areas of science) is a better candidate for an account of how x successfully functions in scientific reasoning.

The salience of divergent criteria of adequacy emerges at several places in this generalized argument.  Not all philosophers take successful functioning as a criterion of adequacy for a theory of induction, explanation, or some other aspect of scientific reasoning.  Thus, premise (I) is problematic.  An anti-realist might hold that scientific reasoning contains a variety of unwarranted existence claims and illicit inferences.  Premise (II) will be more or less plausible depending on which value of the variable is in view and whether a failure is as obvious as Norton claims for theories of induction.  The conclusion (IV) assumes that a material theory of x is in direct competition with any formal theory of x, which implies that material theories exhibit some form of monism (i.e., the theory, if correct, excludes others).
Divergence about criteria of adequacy is most salient in premise (III): why should we give up on formal theories in philosophy of science that abstract away from empirical content in order to purchase universal applicability?  The motivation for Norton’s argument rests heavily on the ‘time to give up’ attitude, but this could be seen as begging the question against formal theories.  Even if one shares the criterion of successful functioning found in premise (I), what provides the stopping rule to forego all attempts at a formal theory?  Consider an alternative to premise (III) that yields a different conclusion:

(III*) The failure of formal theories of x results from not (yet) being able to handle some set of counterexamples that prevent the formal theory of x from accounting for successful functioning.

(IV*) Therefore, we should continue to work on developing a formal theory of x to account for how x successfully functions in scientific reasoning by finding ways to address the counterexamples.

This alternative interpretation of the argument is possible as soon as one does not interpret the failure of formal theories as symptomatic of a deeper problem.  The recalcitrance of difficult conceptual problems (such as the nature of induction) may be an occupational hazard of philosophy.  Rather than being a signal to give up, it is an encouragement to redouble our efforts.  This alternative interpretation could arise from making the criterion of universality primary and the criterion of successful functioning secondary.  Other criteria of adequacy besides universality or successful functioning could be in operation as well.  
What other criteria of adequacy might furnish reasons to prefer premise (III) to (III*) or vice versa?  One criterion that could favor Premise (III*) is the relative success of formal theories over the past century.  Even if they have thus far failed as universal templates, formal theories have succeeded in clarifying and explicating many reasoning practices.  Capitulation is unwarranted given the amount of time needed to work out the details of formal theories, as seen from past examples like probability theory.  Another criterion is the ability to identify a source of normativity (e.g., what sorts good inferences from bad ones)?  In a formal theory, normativity seems to flow from the rules that govern different formal systems; e.g., do not assign or update probabilities in such a way as to expose yourself to Dutch book arguments.  
Once we have recognized that formal theories are motivated by multiple criteria of adequacy, we can anticipate that material theories are motivated by more than just the criterion of successful functioning.  One criterion that also operates in material theories is specificity; a material theory should yield a specific understanding of how reasoning functions in a particular area of science.  Correspondence to the actual scientific practice is required in order to gain insight and provide guidance.  Another criterion that constrains material theories is epistemic transparency.  Abstract, formal theories that postulate hidden structure not present in scientific discourse to account for inductive inference, explanation, or theory structure can obscure how scientists themselves access this structure to evaluate the reasoning (Woodward 2003, ch. 4).  As a consequence, these theories can ignore features of scientific practice that deviate from the hidden structure sought, which prevents them from facing real counterexamples.  Epistemic transparency demands a descriptive correspondence between philosophical theories about science and scientific practice: “pervasive feature[s] of explanatory practice in ...science... [are] features[s] that any adequate theory of explanation must acknowledge” (185).
The fact that multiple, divergent criteria of adequacy govern the formulation of formal and material theories suggests that we interpret the adjectival modifiers “formal” and “material” as markers of different philosophical methodologies.  The conflict between formal and material theories in philosophy of science is in part methodological.  This requires a more explicit identification and characterization of these criteria of adequacy when philosophically analyzing science.  Carl Hempel’s description of philosophical investigation into theory structure and explanation makes these methodological differences explicit.

The standard construal was never claimed to provide a descriptive account of the actual formulation and use of theories by scientists in the ongoing process of scientific inquiry; it was intended, rather, as a schematic explication that would clearly exhibit certain logical and epistemological characteristics of scientists’ theories (Hempel 2001, 222).

These models are not meant to describe how working scientists actually formulate their explanatory accounts.  Their purpose is rather to indicate in reasonably precise terms the logical structure and the rationale of various ways in which empirical science answers explanation-seeking why-questions (Hempel 1965, 412).

Epistemic transparency, specificity, and successful functioning are not criteria of adequacy for Hempel.  The emphasis on “logical structure” is more consonant with criteria of universality, past relative success of formal theories, and having a source of normativity.  A methodological interpretation of formal and material theories directs our attention to two new questions: Are there other criteria of adequacy that operate in philosophical analyses of science? Is there a way to negotiate between the divergent criteria of adequacy found in formal and material theories?

4. Another Criterion of Adequacy
Jerry Fodor’s outspoken criticism of Darwinism (e.g., Fodor 2008) has kicked up a lot of dust and is splashed across the blogosphere.   His argument revolves around how evolutionary theory fails to address the problem of intensionality.  An intensional context is one in which the substitution of coextensive expressions is not valid (e.g., I believe Venus is the Morning Star but I don’t believe Venus is the Evening Star, even though they are extensionally equivalent).  An extensional process, such as natural selection, cannot distinguish between intensionally individuated entities.  Fodor claims that evolutionary theory is committed to an intensional individuation between “snapping at flies in frogs is an adaptation for catching flies” (selection for) and “snapping at flies in frogs is an adaptation for catching buzzing black dots” (selection of).​[1]​  But since natural selection is extensional, it cannot individuate nourishing flies from buzzing black dots.
Evolutionary theory’s inability to individuate nourishing flies from buzzing black dots lands it in the middle of a disjunction problem.  Extensionally, an adaptation for catching flies and an adaptation for catching flies OR buzzing black dots are equivalent.  But evolutionary theory presumes that the two traits (“catching flies” and “catching flies OR catching buzzing black dots”) can be distinguished because they involve different intensions (or properties).  Fodor argues that there are no resources available to evolutionary theory for making this distinction that is fundamental to the theoretical perspective.
A variety of philosophers have criticized this argument, emphasizing how Fodor misunderstands the reasoning in evolutionary biology (e.g., Godfrey-Smith 2008).  These objections to Fodor’s argument have a familiar ring to them: how can evolutionary theory be plagued by the problem of intensionality when reasoning in this domain exhibits successful functioning?  The common refrain is that Fodor’s conclusion represents a reductio ad absurdum.  How can this general problem infect the specificity of reasoning about adaptation and natural selection that displays epistemic transparency, aided in part by past philosophical analysis?  The criteria of adequacy that accompany material theories motivate these objections and other criteria (e.g., universality, relative success of formal theories, sources of normativity) are very much in the background.  I also think these objections are indicative of another criterion of adequacy that is associated with material theories—the avoidance of imported problems.  
An imported problem is any difficulty that derives from the philosophical theories used to analyze science, not from the reasoning found in a particular area of science.  Formal theories are founded on principles that govern the reasoning they concern, such as rules of inference (modus ponens) or introduction and elimination rules.  When applied to a particular domain of scientific practice (explanation, induction, etc.), these principles are prescriptive.  Inferences or explanations that do not live up to the expectations derived from these principles are evaluated negatively (bad inferences or inadequate explanations).  But if scientific reasoning appears to successfully function in spite of violating principles associated with a particular formal theory of that reasoning, then it is not clear that the difficulty is a problem for the science as opposed to being the result of applying the formal theory to the science.  This is a distinct criterion of adequacy associated with material theories: avoid introducing imported problems into philosophical accounts of science.
Fodor’s worry about intensionality looks like an imported problem because it flies in the face of successful functioning, specificity, and epistemic transparency.  When faced with a situation where a philosopher claims that a successfully functioning scientific theory harbors a major unnoticed flaw in its conceptual foundations, a material theorist holds that the burden of proof lies with the philosopher.  Fodor is working within a formal perspective where empirical content doesn’t matter: “the logic of all these cases is always the same” (Fodor 2008, 6).  This does not imply (without further argument) that Fodor holds to a particular formal theory, such as the syntactic view of theory structure (cf. Godfrey-Smith 2008).  The worry about imported problems only assumes Norton’s broad sense of ‘formal’: no empirical content and a single, universal template (‘all the cases are the same’).   The disjunction problem assumes that the scientific theory predicates used in categorizing adaptive traits operate according to specific rules where the addition of a disjunct results in logical equivalence.  No biological theory has the resources to individuate intensionally equivalent traits on Fodor’s assumptions.  And Fodor is not alone in holding a formal theory perspective: “Many professional philosophers deal exclusively in schemata…it [is] common practice to conceive of “theories” in entirely generic and logic dominated terms” (Wilson 2006, 27, 178).  But a material theory of adaptive trait categorization will incorporate the content of evolutionary theory.  There is no empirical reason to think that buzzing black dots are relevant once we incorporate the life history, ecology, and phylogeny of anurans.  Flies are relevant; buzzing black dots are not.  There are resources for distinguishing between an adaptation for catching flies and an adaptation for catching flies OR buzzing black dots.​[2]​  The “problem of intensionality” looks like an imported problem from the perspective of a material theory of adaptive trait categorization.​[3]​
The identification of another criterion of adequacy associated with material theories (the avoidance of imported problems) does not exhaust the criteria of adequacy that can operate in formal and material theories.  Other criteria that might attend formal theories include aiming for more abstract (as opposed to specific) accounts of reasoning and providing an account of (scientific) rationality.  Material theories might incorporate a criterion to account for the role of values (epistemic and/or non-epistemic) in evaluating inferences or explanations (cf. Steel 2005).  What our discussion reveals is that adjudicating directly between formal and material theories in philosophy of science overlooks their methodological differences, which arise from divergent criteria of adequacy.  Delineating these criteria of adequacy is a necessary step in understanding the difference in philosophical methodologies.  The question that remains is whether there are any strategies for negotiating between these differences or whether we are left with incommensurable modes of philosophical analysis.

5. Pluralism and Divergent Criteria of Adequacy
In Section 2 we saw that formal theories are characterized by (a) the absence of empirical content, which makes a template applicable to all empirical reasoning, and (b) monism, which means the theory (if correct) excludes others.  Material theories are in direct conflict with (a) by relying on specific empirical content, but we observed in the generalized negative argument (Section 3) that material theories also exhibit a version of (b).  This implies that a correct or adequate material theory will exclude other material theories in the same way that different formal theories are in competition with one another.  One way to negotiate between the divergent criteria of adequacy associated with formal and material theories is to give up (b), the commitment to monism.  To make this move we need to say more about monism, and pluralism as an alternative (cf. Kellert et al. 2006). 
Philosophical monism in a theory of some aspect of scientific reasoning, such as explanation, induction, or discovery, holds that there is a single correct way to account for the aspect.  If hypothetico-deductivism is the correct theory of inductive inference, then Bayesianism and Norton’s material theory of induction are wrong.  Although there may not be agreement about which theory is correct, the goal is to seek a single, complete, and comprehensive account of explanation, theory structure, or some other aspect in terms of a core set of fundamental principles (e.g., the axioms of probability theory for inductive inference or laws for explanation).  A single correct account is available in principle even if in practice it eludes our current grasp.  In contrast, philosophical pluralism in a theory of some aspect of scientific reasoning holds that there is more than one correct way to account for the aspect, and ‘correctness’ depends on the goals of a philosophical inquiry.  If hypothetico-deductivism is a correct theory of inductive inference, then Bayesianism and Norton’s material theory of induction might also be correct according to different criteria: “analysis of meta scientific concepts (like theory, explanation, evidence) should reflect the possibility that the explanatory and investigative aims of science can be best achieved by sciences that are pluralistic, even in the long run” (Kellert et al. 2006, ix-x).  Pluralism directs our attention to the various criteria of adequacy operative in different philosophical methods.  It gives us a path to fully acknowledge the divergent criteria associated with formal and material theories.  These criteria of adequacy are the correctness conditions that accompany what it means to have an adequate account of some aspect of scientific reasoning.  As a result, it is possible to have more than one correct account.
	Pluralism’s utility in negotiating between divergent criteria of adequacy can be augmented by treating different criteria as regulative ideals or heuristics.  Instead of criteria of adequacy (reject a formal theory that is not universal or reject a material theory that doesn’t account for successful functioning), a heuristic can be deemed useful even when it fails.  A reductionist research heuristic tells us to decompose a system into parts and look for an explanation of its behavior in terms of the causal interactions among the parts (see Wimsatt 2007).  But a reductionist explanation may not be available.  The heuristic is still valuable because it tells you how to proceed; that is, it has methodological import.  If universality, successful functioning, and other criteria of adequacy are interpreted heuristically, then we can seek universality in our formal theories and successful functioning in our material theories simultaneously, despite the tension among the criteria, and potentially add to our understanding of scientific reasoning even when they fail.​[4]​
Adopting a heuristic view of formal and material theories is in the spirit of pluralism because it doesn’t presume a single, correct theory is waiting in the wings to be discovered.  Our theories can be incorrect or false but in useful and illuminating ways.  We treat our theories as idealizations, which involve describing, modeling, or depicting via purposeful departures from features known to be present.  Formal and material theories idealize scientific reasoning in different ways; they ignore variations in properties or exclude particular values for variables.  It is advantageous to have numerous idealizations available since they often focus on different features of scientific reasoning in a complementary fashion.  
The simultaneous pursuit of formal and material theories in philosophy of science can be seen as a division of labor driven by divergent criteria of adequacy in order to yield a more robust explication or justification of diverse aspects of reasoning in the sciences.  A consequence of this division of labor is the existence of a permanent tension among philosophical analyses of science.  Formal theories will frequently violate the criteria of adequacy associated with material theories and vice versa; they pull in different directions.  But a methodological interpretation of formal and material theories gives us the resources for understanding this tension and valuing it in the philosophical research community.  Pluralism encourages philosophers of science to generate a more robust picture of scientific reasoning through a combination of idealized theories, formal and material, using a variety of different modes of analysis.

6. Conclusion
Patrick Suppes once offered the following methodological stricture on philosophical analyses of science: “The more explicit the analysis the less place there is for non-formal considerations. …the only systematic results possible in the theory of scientific methodology are purely formal” (Suppes 1962, 260-1).  A methodological interpretation of formal and material theories as reflecting divergent criteria of adequacy allows us to see how these comments reflect criteria associated with formal theories: absence of empirical content (because “more explicit” means articulating logical relations) and universality (because “systematic” means fully general and applicable to all sciences).  Additionally, philosophical pluralism allows us to affirm the sentiment in his remarks by foregrounding their distinct methodical commitments, while making space for other interpretations of “more explicit” and “systematic” that arise from criteria such as successful functioning, specificity, and epistemic transparency. 
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^1	  Technically, both statements involve selection for and selection of claims.  The suppressed (intuitive) premise is that the former should be true for evolutionary explanations and not the latter; there should be selection for catching flies, but only selection of buzzing black dots.
^2	  Just as gemology has resources for distinguishing between green and grue with respect to emeralds.
^3	  Psychological investigation shows that training with specific empirical content mitigates the effects of irrelevant disjuncts (Manning and Schreier-Pandal 1993).
^4	  “Axiomatic examination represents an extremely useful probative tool, even if a discipline, in the final analysis, fails to submit completely to its strictures” (Wilson 2006, 126).
